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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- STATE REGULATION OF HOURS OF LABOR PoLICE PowER AND DuE PROCESS - A South Carolina statute 1 prohibited
labor of employees in enumerated manufacturing and mercantile establishments for more than fifty-six hours per w.eek or more than twelve hours in
any one day. Plaintiffs were druggists who brought suit to restrain the commissioner of labor from enforcing the statute. A temporary restraining order
was issued and the commissioner of labor appealed. Held, the statute was un-

1

S. C. Acts (1938), No. 943.

1939}

RECENT DECISIONS

constitutional as in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses
in both state and federal constitutions. Gasque, Inc. v. Nates, (S. C. 1939)

2 S. E. (2d) 36.
The recent tendency of the United States Supreme Court has been to
uphold similar social legislation as a valid exercise of the police power. 2 In
holding the statute to be an improper exercise of the police power, the case
seems out of line with this trend. Courts have generally upheld statutes regulating maximum hours of (a) women and children,8 (b) state employees,4
(c) persons engaged in dangerous occupations where the gt:neral welfare of
the workers in those occupations is a matter of serious public concern,5 and
( d) persons in occupations where continuous employment for long hours might
be dangerous to the public at large. 6 The real difficulty arises when the statute
prescribes a general blanket regulation of industry. In 1917 the Supreme
Court upheld an Oregon statute limiting the hours of labor in mills, factories
and manufacturing establishments to ten hours per day.7 But there is no degree
of uniformity in the state courts.8 The difference between regulation of men
and women lies only in the degree of necessity. 9 It follows that the legislature should be allowed a considerable amount of discretion in determining the
need for maximum hour legislation. Thus on principle it is submitted that any
regulation of the maximum hours of labor, unless it is arbitrary or capricious,
should be upheld as a valid exercise of the police power.10 In several of the late
cases a new factor has been introduced. There is a growing recognition that
many of the statutes were enacted not as health measures but with the purpose
2
See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937),
upholding minimum wage legislation and expressly overruling Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394 (1923).
8
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28 S. Ct. 324 (1908).
~ Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 24 S. Ct. 124 (1903).
11
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 18 S. Ct. 383 (1898), upholding a statute
regulating mines, smelters, and refineries.
6
ln re Twing, 188 Cal. 261, 204 P. 1082 (1922), upholding a statute regulating employees in drug stores on the theory that putting up prescriptions under
fatigue endangers the public at large. Most states have statutes regulating truck
drivers, for everyone realizes that a sleepy truck driver endangers the public at large.
H.P. Welch Co. v. State, 89 N. H. 428, 199 A. 886, 120 A. L. R. 282 at 295
(1938).
7
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, 37 S. Ct. 435 (1917).
8
Some state courts in interpreting the due process clause in their state constitutions are more conservative than the federal courts in interpreting the federal
due process clause. Holgate Bros. Co. v. Bashore, 45 Dauph. Co. (Pa.) 274, affd.
331 Pa. 255, 200 A. 672 (1938), holding a Pennsylvania 44-hour per week statute
invalid; State v. Henry, 37 N. M. 536, 25 P. (2d) 204, 90 A. L. R. 805 at 814
(1933); United States v. Northern Commercial Co., 6 Alaska 94 (1918). But see
State v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 106 Mont. 182, 76 P. (2d) 81 (1938).
9
State v. Bunting, 71 Ore. 259 at 271, 139 P. 731 (1914).
10
This is the view taken by most of the leading writers on the subject. See
Frankfurter, "Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law," 29 HARV. L.
REV. 353 (1916); Hand, "Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day," 21 HARV.
L. REV. 495 (1908).
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of spreading employment. This was held to be a proper legislative purpose in
a recent Montana decision.11 The statute in the principal case has more of
the characteristics of a health measure,1 2 but it has the incidental effect of
spreading out employment as well. It might have been upheld on either basis.
However, the result the court reached can be justified on the ground that the
statute denied certain classes of people equal protection of the laws. In making
a general blanket regulation and then providing for certain excepted industries,
there is always a danger that the legislature will make an arbitrary classification.
It is proper to make a classification if there is some reasonable basis of distinction, but the statute in the principal case appears to have been clearly arbitrary.
From a glance at the parallel columns of businesses regulated contrasted to
those not regulated 18 the discrimination between different classes is made
apparent. Thus laundries were exempted but dry cleaning establishments were
regulated. Eating places in connection with hotels were exempted while private
restaurants were regulated. The statute bears the marks of pressure exerted by
particular groups upon the legislature. At any rate, it was not success£ully shown
before the court that there was a logical basis for the classification.14

11 State v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 106 Mont. 182 at 201, 76 P. (2d) 81 (1938):
"No one can say positively whether the Act was passed in an attempt to adjust
unemployment by creating more jobs, to promote health, or whether it was simply
for the general prosperity and welfare of the state as a whole. The object may well
have been a combination of all such purposes. We are not called upon to say precisely
what the object really was, so long as any of these purposes might reasonably have
been accomplished by the Act." See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 at 537,
54 S. Ct. 505 (1934): "a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare.•.."
The provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 32 Stat. L. 1060 (1938),
29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1938), § 201 et seq., are questionable as health measures for they
contemplate a 40-hour week with the provision of time and a half for overtime. See
Cooper, "Extra Time for Overtime," 37 M1cH. L. REv. 28 at 46 (1938). The act
has been upheld in a recent Puerto Rico decision. See 7 U. S. LAw WEEK 323
(Oct. 3, 1939).
12 The statute in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, 37 S. Ct. 435 (1917),
provided for a Io-hour day and was held to be a health measure. The statute in the
principal case partakes more of a health measure for it does not contain the more
drastic limitations of other state statutes.
18 Principal case, 2 S. E. (2d) at 43.
14 On the validity of ordinances regulating closing hours of stores and shops,
see note 36 M1cH. L. REv. 850 (1938).

